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Education Reference Guide: Private & Public Funding; Contents; Introduction; Financial Aspects / Budget Processes; Public Education Finance; Grants & Private Funding; Education & the Economy; Poverty Reduction Strategies; Tuition-Free College; School Vouchers; Land-Grant Universities; The Rhodes Scholarship; Government Assistance for Teacher Education.

Education Reference Guide: Private & -- Public Funding -- Contents -- Introduction -- Financial Aspects / Budget Processes -- Public Education Finance -- Grants & -- Private Funding -- Education & -- the Economy -- Poverty Reduction Strategies -- Tuition-Free College -- School Vouchers -- Land-Grant Universities -- The Rhodes Scholarship -- Government Assistance for Teacher Education.

This paper studies the typical European system for public funding of parties, where parties receive public funds depending on their vote share. These funds finance electoral campaigns. It is shown that such a funding system increases policy convergence. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. If the parties have access to other means of campaign finance given in a lump-sum way, the effect is moderated. ; Ortuno-Ortin gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT PB-970131 ; Publicado

This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parties receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds …nance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the …rst some voters are policy motivated and some are "impressionable" - their vote depends directly on campaign expenditures. In the second campaigning is informative and all voters are policy motivated. Public funds increase policy convergence in both cases. The e¤ect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. When campaigns are informative, there may be multiple equilibria. Intuitively, a large party can stay large since it receives large funds.

Our existing federal campaign finance system – the product of Watergate Era legislation and the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo – is in a state of disarray. The system is no longer capable of accomplishing the goals pursued by Congress and embraced by the Court a quarter-century ago: full disclosure of the sources of campaign money; limitations on large contributions by individuals; prohibitions on the use of corporate and union treasury funds; and voluntary, partial public funding, with spending limits, in the Presidential election. Indeed, the current law may actually have negative consequences, with unindexed contribution limits encouraging evasion, driving up the burdens of fundraising, providing a major role for organized interest groups and bundlers, and placing a premium on the personal wealth of candidates.

Tracing the development of the law of public funding in the United States, assessing the impact of the Arizona Free Enterprise decision on public funding, and discussing the options for public funding after Arizona Free Enterprise

Community colleges receive much less funding per student than public four-year institutions, even though they serve a greater proportion of students who are underrepresented in higher education and who may need additional programs and supports to be successful. Research shows that per-student spending by colleges is directly related to student outcomes and that a lack of resources is a major impediment to community college effectiveness.[1] Better resourced institutions have higher retention and attainment rates, among Black and Latinx students in particular.[2][3] But community colleges often lack the resources to implement reforms that research has shown lead to better and more equitable outcomes. There is wide variation in state policy contexts, governance structures, and funding mechanisms among community colleges. More than half of their public funding comes from state and local governments, and while federal funding has increased in recent decades, state funding has fallen.[4] The large infusion of federal dollars during the pandemic—as well as debate over increasing the federal role—has made effective federal funding policy even more critical.

This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parteis receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first, some voters are policy motivated and some are ?impressionable? ? their vote depends directly on campaign expenditures. In the second, campaigning is informative and all voters are policy motivated. Public funds increase policy convergence in both cases. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. When campaigns are informative, there may be multiple euqilibria. Intuitively, a large party can stay large since it receives large funds.

Recent criticism from different sides has expressed the view that, with scarce resources, there is little justification for massive public funding of higher education. Central to the debate is the conjecture that colleges and universities use their resources inefficiently and focus insufficiently on their mission to expand students' human potential. Our aim in this paper is to examine the theoretical premises of this conjecture in a small open economy and uncover the conditions under which public investment in higher education is efficient and desirable. We analyze non-stationary equilibria of an OLG economy, characterized by perfect capital mobility, intergenerational transfers and a hierarchical education system. The government uses income tax revenues to finance basic education and support higher education that generates skilled labor. Given this, the following issues are considered: (a) the impact of education and international markets on the equilibrium number of low-skilled and skilled workers in each generation; (b) the economic efficiency of public subsidies to higher education in generating skilled human capital; (c) the endogenous support for a government's educational policies found in a political equilibrium.